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RELIGIOUS LIBERTY IN THE PUBLIC HIGH
SCHOOL: BIBLE STUDY CLUBS
INTRODUCTION

In 1969, the United States Supreme Court declared, "It can
hardly be argued that either students or teachers shed their constitutional rights to freedom of speech or expression at the
schoolhouse gate."' In Tinker v. Des Moines School District,the
Court further asserted, "Students in school as well as out of
school are 'persons' under the Constitution. They are possessed
of fundamental rights which the state must respect .... -2 Even
prior to Tinker the Court had stressed the importance of protecting constitutional freedom in public schools. 3 Tinker upheld a
high school student's first amendment freedom of speech when
that student spoke out against the Viet Nam war by wearing a
black armband. 4 The Court, however, pointed out that while the
high school citizen has certain constitutional rights a problem
arises when the exercise of those rights conflicts with the constitutional rules by which the school authorities must abide.5 Such
a problem arises when a student expresses his right to exercise
freely his religion at a public high school. Although the student
possesses a freedom of religious exercise, the public school has
a mandate to refrain from acting in a manner which establishes
religion in the school.

6

1. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community School Dist., 393 U.S. 503,
506 (1969).
2. Id. at 511.
3. Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479 (1960) (striking on Arkansas statute
requiring teachers to fie annually a list of organizations to which they belong). "The vigilant protection of constitutional freedom is nowhere more
vital than in the community of American schools." Id. at 487.
4. 393 U.S. at 503. The Court held that the wearing of armbands was
"closely akin to 'pure speech' which ... is entitled to comprehensive protection under the First Amendment." Id. at 506. The individual exercising
such speech, however, must do so without "materially and substantially interferling] with the requirements of appropriate discipline in the operation
of the school ... ." Id. at 513 (quoting Burnside v. Byars, 363 F.2d 744, 749
(5th Cir. 1966) (upholding students' right to wear freedom buttons)). See
generally Devine, A Note on Tinker, 7 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 539 (1971);
Note, Symbolic Speech, High School Protestand the FirstAmendment, 3 J.
FAM. L. 119 (1960); Note, ConstitutionalLaw--Symbolic Speech-Wearing of
Arm Bands to Protest Viet Nam War, 20 MERCER L. REV. 505 (1969).

5. 393 U.S. at 507.
6. The first amendment provides: "Congress shall make no laws respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise
thereof; . . ." U.S. CONST. amend. I. The first clause of the amendment is
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The conflict between the high school student's religious exercise and the school's anti-establishment stance has histori-7
cally resulted in the denial of the student's desired expression.
For two decades, state and federal courts have constructed a virtually insurmountable wall between church and state-a wall
erected at the expense of high school students' freedom of religious expression. State-required prayer has been banned from
the classroom.8 Compulsory Bible reading exercises have been
declared unconstitutional. 9 Legislative enactments 10 and school
policies 1 ' permitting student-initiated voluntary prayer have
known as the establishment clause. It guarantees the state's and the
church's mutual independence. The second clause of the amendment is
known as the free exercise clause. It guarantees the individual's freedom to
exercise his religious beliefs. Both clauses were made applicable to the
states through the fourteenth amendment in Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310
U.S. 296 (1940).

7. See infra notes 104-57 and accompanying text.
8. Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962) (enjoining New York Board of
Education from continuing its use of an official prayer required at beginning
of each school day). See infra notes 89-92 and accompanying text.
9. School Dist. of Abington Township v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203
(1963) (invalidating Pennsylvania statute requiring reading of at least ten
Bible verses, without comment, at start of each school day).
10. Karen B. v. Treen, 653 F.2d 897, 899 (5th Cir. 1981) (Louisiana statute
providing that a "school board may authorize the appropriate school officials to allow each classroom teacher to ask whether any student wishes to
offer a prayer" declared unconstitutional), affd mem., 455 U.S. 913 (1982);
Kent v. Commissioner of Educ., 380 Mass. 235, 402 N.E.2d 1340 (1980) (Massachusetts law allowing a period of prayer in all grades in all public schools
offered by a student volunteer declared unconstitutional).
The Massachusetts and Tennessee legislatures have struggled with this
issue. See Opinions of the Justices to the House of Representatives, 387
Mass. 1201, 440 N.E.2d 1159 (1982) (advising legislature that proposed bill
providing for a moment of meditation or voluntary prayer to begin each
class day is unconstitutional) and cases cited infra note 11. But see Gaines
v. Anderson, 421 F. Supp. 337 (D. Mass. 1976) (three judge panel) (dismissing students' complaint regarding Massachusetts' statute requiring a

period of silence for prayer or meditation). The court determined that the
inclusion of the word "meditation" and the framing of the statute in the
disjunctive ("meditation 'or' prayer"), saved it from violating the establishment clause. See generally Kauper, Prayer, Public Schools and The

Supreme Court, 61 MICH. L. REV. 1031 (1963); Note, Daily Moments of Silence
in Public Schools: A ConstitutionalAnalysis, 58 N.Y.U. L. REV. 364 (1983).
11. Commissioner of Educ. v. School Comm. of Leyden, 358 Mass. 776,
267 N.E.2d 226 (1971) (enjoining school committee from implementing a resolution allowing, inter alia, students to participate in voluntary religious exercises of prayer and Bible reading), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 849 (1971).
Contra Reed v. Van Hoven, 237 F. Supp. 48 (W.D. Mich. 1965) (denying injunction to parents of public school students, thereby upholding school district's policy of allowing students to pray before classes begin). Reed is an
anomoly among prayer cases and has received strong criticism. Brandon v.
Board of Educ., 635 F.2d 971, 979 n. 9 (2d Cir. 1980) ("While the outcome of
the case was questionable even in 1965, the Supreme Court's adoption of
the entanglement test in 1969, .. seriously undercuts the holding."), cert.
denied, 454 U.S. 1123 (1981).
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been declared unconstitutional. School policies prohibiting student-initiated voluntary prayer have been upheld. 12 Student-initiated voluntary religious clubs have been prohibited. 13 In each
case the courts found that permitting the religious expression
was an impermissible act tantamount to establishing a
14
religion.
Students at public universities have also been confronted
with a denial of their requests to express their religion.' 5 In
1981, however, the Supreme Court determined that the religious
beliefs of public university students could be accommodated. In
12. Brandon v. Board of Educ., 635 F.2d 971 (2d Cir. 1980) (upholding
school district's refusal to allow students to meet for communal prayer
before classes), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1123 (1981); Stein v. Oshinsky, 348 F.2d
999 (2d Cir.) (upholding school principal's ban on student-initiated prayer),
cert. denied, 382 U.S. 957 (1965).

13. Lubbock Civil Liberties Union v. Lubbock Indep. School Dist., 669
F.2d 1038 (5th Cir. 1982) (school district's permission allowing students to
gather at school before or after school hours on the same basis as other
school groups declared unconstitutional), cert. denied, 103 S.Ct. 800 (1983);
Brandon v. Board of Educ., 635 F.2d 971 (2d Cir. 1980) (district's refusal to
allow students to meet as a group for communal prayer before classes upheld), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1123 (1981); Hunt v. Board of Educ., 321 F. Supp.
1263 (S.D. W. Va. 1971) (memorandum order) (school board's refusal to
grant permission to high school students to meet as a group before school
upheld); Johnson v. Huntington Beach Union High School Dist., 68 Cal.
App. 3d 1, 137 Cal. Rptr. 43 (2-1 decision) (school district's refusal to permit
students' Bible club to meet upheld), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 877 (1977);
Trietley v. Board of Educ., 65 A.D.2d 1, 409 N.Y.S.2d 912 (1978) (school
board's refusal to permit formation of Bible study clubs in high school upheld). Contra Bender v. Williamsport Area School Dist., 563 F. Supp. 697
(M.D. Pa. 1983) (school district's refusal to permit student prayer club to
meet during the school's activity period held unconstitutional). See infra
notes 104-57 and accompanying text.
14. See, e.g., Lubbock Civil Liberties Union, 669 F.2d at 1048 ("Our examination of [the policy] according to the purpose, effect and entanglement
analysis articulated by the Supreme Court indicates, as to all three questions, impermissible establishment of religion exists."); Brandon, 635 F.2d
at 980 ("Establishment clause considerations must prevail in this context."). Accord Hunt, 321 F. Supp. at 1267; Johnson, 68 Cal. App. 3d at 14-15,
137 Cal. Rptr. at 51; Trietley, 65 A.D.2d at 451, 409 N.Y.S.2d at 916-17.
15. When students at the University of Delaware sought to accommodate their religious beliefs by worshipping in their dormitories they were
confronted with a lawsuit by the University. University of Delaware v. Keegan, 318 A.2d 135 (Del. Ch. 1974), rev'd, Keegan v. University of Delaware,
349 A.2d 14 (Del. Super. Ct. 1975) (granting students the right to worship
only in a commons room of the dormitory), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 934 (1976).
The Delaware Supreme Court emphasized that it was dealing with a peculiar situation involving only a university campus dormitory. Id. See also
Chess v. Widmar, 480 F. Supp. 907 (W.D. Mo. 1979) (memorandum opinion
and order) (upholding University of Missouri-Kansas City's refusal to recognize a religious club on campus), rev'd, 635 F.2d 1310 (8th Cir. 1980), affd
sub nom., Vincent v. Widmar, 454 U.S. 263 (1981). The district court in Chess
criticized the Delaware Supreme Court's reversal, finding its outcome "not
supported by the controlling law." 480 F. Supp. at 916.
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Widmar v. Vincent,16 after declaring religious worship a protected form of speech, 17 the Court stated that a policy of accommodation does not violate the establishment clause if it passes a
three-pronged test: (a) is there a secular purpose; (b) is its primary effect neither the advancement nor inhibition of religion;
and (c) does it avoid fostering an excessive entanglement with
religion. 18 The Court concluded that the university's accomodation of its students' religious clubs (by recognizing them and
permitting them to use university facilities) passed this test. 19
As a result, the Court held that where a university creates a forum for student organizations or clubs, discrimination against
Bible study groups under the rationale that allowing such clubs
would violate the establishment clause is a content-based discrimnatory policy which is constitutionally offensive and
20
unnecessary.
The seemingly logical extension of these rights from the
university to the high school campus has yet to take place on a
national level. Three courts have heard high school Bible club
cases since the Widmar decision. Two of these courts 2 1 have
distinguished their cases from Widmar. The third court has followed Widmar and applied its holding to a high school Bible
study group case. 22 The Supreme Court has failed to clarify the
23
situation.
The thesis of this comment is that when a public high school
provides an activity period for its student body, a student-initi16. 454 U.S. 263 (1981) (8-1 decision). See generally Smart, Widmar v.

Vincent and the Purposes of the Establishment Clause, 9 J.C. & U.L. 469

(1982-83) (written by lead counsel for student group in the case); Note, Constitutional Law-FirstAmendment-State University Regulation Prohibiting Use of Facilitiesfor Religious Worship or Teaching Violates FreeSpeech
Rights, 66 MARQ. L. REV. 178 (1982). See infra notes 158-71 and accompany-

ing text.
17. 454 U.S. at 269.
18. Id. at 271. This three-pronged test was first set forth in Lemon v.
Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971) (declaring unconstitutional a Pennsylvania
statute providing, inter alia, funds to be paid to teachers in nonpublic
schools). See infra notes 28-103 and accompanying text.
19. 454 U.S. at 271-75.
20. Id. at 277.
21. Lubbock Civil Liberties Union, 669 F.2d at 1048 ("This reliance [on
Widmar I is misplaced."); Brandon, 635 F.2d at 980 ("A high school classroom, however, is different.").
22. Bender, 563 F. Supp. at 716 ("Widmar appears nearly 'on point.' ").
23. The Court has had opportunity to hear both Lubbock and Brandon.
Lubbock Civil Liberties Union v. Lubbock Indep. School Dist., 669 F.2d 1038
(5th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 800 (1983); Brandon v. Board of Educ.,
635 F.2d 971 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1123 (1981). The Court refused to hear Johnson v. Huntington Beach Union High School Dist., 68 Cal.
App. 3d 1, 137 Cal. Rptr. 43, cert. denied, 434 U.S. 877 (1977) on procedural
grounds. (appeal was not from decision of highest court).
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ated voluntary Bible study club has a constitutional right to exist. This comment consists of four parts. The first part
examines the constitutional border which exists in the first
amendment religion clauses and the tests promulgated by the
courts to protect that border. 24 The second part examines the
courts' application of these tests to cases involving high school
Bible study clubs. 25 The third part examines Widmar v. Vincent.26 The fourth part argues the proposition set forth in the
27
thesis.
POLICING THE CONSTITUTIONAL BORDERS: THE TESTS

Inherent within the first amendment religion clauses is a
conflict: 28 the government shall make no law respecting the establishment of a religion and it shall not prohibit the free exercise of religion. The intent of the framers 29 was to create two
social entities, state and church. 30 These two entities were to be
separate; neither was to interfere with the other. The framers
intended that the state and the church should not be one, inter31
related body. Nor should one exercise control over the other.
Of course, such a separation is ideal, not real. 32 Yet a separation
24. See infra notes 28-103 and accompanying text.
25. See infra notes 104-57 and accompanying text.

26. See infra notes 158-71 and accompanying text.
27. See infra notes 172-205 and accompanying text.
28. Professor Nowak would call it a "natural antagonism."

See J. No-

WAK, CONSTITUTIONAL LAw 1029 (2d ed. 1983).

29. "There is a seemingly irresistible impulse to appeal to history when
analyzing issues under the religion clauses. This is unfortunate because
there is no clear history as to the meaning of the clauses." Id. For the
Supreme Court's diverse understanding of the early history of these
clauses, the following cases provide a broad spectrum of analysis. Walz v.
Tax Comm'n of N.Y., 397 U.S. 664, 681-87 (1970) (Brennan, J., concurring);
Illinois ex rel. McCollum v. Board of Educ., 333 U.S. 203, 214-24 (1948)
(Frankfurter, J., concurring); Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 8-16
(1947).
30. See, e.g., Everson, 330 U.S. at 31-32 (Rutledge, J., dissenting) ("[The
object of the First Amendment] was to create a complete and permanent
separation of the spheres of religious activity and civil authority by comprehensively forbidding every form of public aid or support for religion.") See
also McCollum, 333 U.S. at 212 ("[Tlhe First Amendment rests upon the
premise that both religion and government can but work to achieve their
lofty aims if each is left free from the other within its respective sphere.").
31. For the various "working relationships" a state and a church may
create, see R. BATES, RELIGIOUS LIBERTY: AN INQUIRY 9-14, 239-52 (1945); C.
COBB, PAKISTAN, THE DEVELOPMENT OF ITS LAWS AND CONSTITUTION 11-15
(1957); M. KELLER, CHURCH AND STATE ON THE EUROPEAN CONTINENT 23-31
(1953); 1 A. STOKES, CHURCH AND STATE IN THE UNITED STATES 151-69 (1950).

32. See Walz, 397 U.S. at 670 ("No perfect or absolute separation is really
possible."); Roemer v. Board of Pub. Works of Md., 426 U.S. 740, 746 (1976)
("[A] hermetic separation of the two is an impossibility.").
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33
as real as that envisioned in a wall is the constitutional goal.

This image of a wall of separation leaves a picture of concrete tangibility. Nothing could be further from the truth. 34 Repeatedly the courts have strained to identify the line marking a
proper separation of church and state. Such a line, however, has
been elusive. 35 It has tended to meander, 36 and occasionally is
37
only dimly perceived.
At the very least the religion clauses mean that "neither a
state or Federal Government can set up a church. '38 But, of
course, they mean more than this.3 9 More generally the clauses
mean that the government should not intrude into the realm of
religion. The state may not prohibit religion, but, neither may it
sponsor religion. The government must remain benevolently
33. See Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. (8 Otto) 145, 164 (1878) (quoting T. Jefferson, Reply from Thomas Jefferson to an Address by a Committee
of the Danbury Baptist Association, in 8 WORKS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 113
(Washington ed. 1861).
34. Even portraying the concept of separation with the image of a wall
has proven to be the source of controversy. Some justices cling to it for its
image as an easily grasped separation. See, e.g., McCollum, 333 U.S. at 231
(Frankfurter, J., concurring) ("Separation means separation, not something
less. Jefferson's metaphor in describing the relation between Church and
State speaks of a 'wall of separation,' not a fine line."); Stein v. Oshinsky,
348 F.2d 999, 1002 (2d Cir.) (inferring that the wall cannot be built too high),
cert. denied, 382 U.S. 957 (1965). Others criticize the image itself: "A rule of
law should not be drawn from a figure of speech." McCollum, 333 U.S. at 247
(Reed, J., dissenting).
35. "The fact is that the line which separates the secular from the sectarian in American life is elusive." Abington School, 374 U.S. at 231 (Brennan, J., concurring). Justice Brennan explained, 'The difficulty of defining
the boundary with precision inheres in a paradox central to our scheme of
liberty. While our institutions reflect a firm conviction that we are a religious people, those institutions by solemn constitutional injunction may not
officially involve religion in such a way as to prefer, discriminate against, or
oppress a particular sect or religion." Id. Accord Board of Educ. v. Allen,
392 U.S. 236, 242 (1967) (the line is not easy to locate); Gaines, 421 F. Supp.
at 341 (the line is an elusive one); Keegan, 318 A.2d at 138 (same).
36. Walz, 397 U.S. at 669 (The "course of constitutional neutrality in this
area cannot be an absolutely straight line."). See also Sherbert v. Verner,
374 U.S. 398, 422 (1963) (Harlan, J., dissenting) ("[The line] is not so narrow
a channel that the slightest deviation from an absolutely straight course
leads to condemnation.").
37. Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612.
38. Everson, 330 U.S. at 15. But see McCollum, 333 U.S. at 244 (Reed, J.,
dissenting) (the establishment clause may only have been intended to prevent the establishing of a state church). Accord 3 J. STORY, COMMENTARIES
ON THE CONSTrruTION OF THE UNITED STATES 928 (1833).
39. McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 442 (1960) ("[This Court] has
found that the First and Fourteenth Amendments afford protection against
religious establishment far more extensive than merely to forbid a national
or state church.").
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neutral.4° It should seek to accomodate religion without supporting it.41 As Justice Douglas said in Zorach v. Clauson,42
"When the state encourages religious institutions or cooperates
with religious authorities by adjusting the schedule of public
'43
events to sectarian needs, it follows the best of our traditions.
But too much accomodation may result in establishment.
It was for this reason that, in Lemon v. Kurtzman,44 the
Court announced a tripartite test.4 5 For the government to allow

any activity which is religiously oriented, that activity must pass
all three prongs of the test. If the activity fails the test, it violates the first amendment establishment clause. The test provides that, "First, the statute must have a secular legislative
40. Walz, 397 U.S. at 669. See also Abington School, 374 U.S. at 222

("wholesome neutrality"); Roemer v. Board of Pub. Works of Md., 426 U.S.
736, 745 (1976) ("scrupulous neutrality").
41. See McCollum, 333 U.S. at 255-56 (Reed, J., dissenting) ('The prohibition enactments respecting the establishment of religion do not bar every
friendly gesture between church and state."). See also Johnson, 68 Cal.
App. 3d at 10, 137 Cal. Rptr. at 47 ("[Not] all cooperation between the secular and the religious is condemned.").
42. 343 U.S. 306 (1952) (upholding New York City's program of releasing
elementary and secondary students from their classes for a period of time
for religious instruction).
43. Id. at 313-14. The Court continued:
To hold that it may not [accommodate] would be to find in the Constitution a requirement that the government show a callous indifference
to religious groups. That would be preferring those who believe in no
religion over those who do believe. Government may not finance religious groups nor undertake religious instruction nor blend secular and
sectarian education nor use secular institutions to force one or some
religion on any person. But we find no constitutional requirement
which makes it necessary for government to be hostile to religion and
to throw its weight against efforts to widen the effective scope of religious influence. The government must be neutral when it comes to
competition between sects. It may not thrust any sect on any person. It
may not make a religious observance compulsory. It may not coerce
anyone to attend church, to observe a religious holiday, or to take religious instruction.
Id. at 314. See also Engel, 370 U.S. at 433-34 (separation is not hostility);
Abington School, 374 U.S. at 306 (Goldberg, J., concurring) (untutored devotion to the concept of neutrality can "lead to invocation or approval of results which partake not simply of that noninterference and noninvolvement
with the religious which the Constitution commands, but of a brooding and
pervasive devotion to the secular and a passive, or even active, hostility to
the religious.").
44. 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
45. Id. at 612-13. The first two questions of the test originated in Abington School, 374 U.S. at 222 (actually articulating McGowan, 366 U.S. at 442).
The third question originated in Walz, 397 U.S. at 674. The addition of the
third test was over Justice White's objection. Roemer, 426 U.S. at 768 (dissenting) ("I have never understood the constitutional foundation for this
added element; it is at once both insoluably paradoxical and-as the Court
has conceded from the outset-a 'blurred, indistinct, and variable barrier.'"
(citations omitted)).
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purpose; second, its principal or primary effect must be one that
neither advances nor inhibits religion; finally, the statute must
not foster an excessive government entanglement with religion."46 The remainder of this section examines each part of the
Lemon test.
Secular Purpose
The secular purpose prong of the Lemon test is the easiest
to satisfy. The showing of the least colorable secular design will
succeed in overcoming the hurdle. 47 An examination of the
leading cases in two areas-state financial aid to religious causes
and state permission of religious activity in the classroom-demonstrates this.
In Everson v. Board of Education," the Board resolved to
reimburse parents for the bus fares expended by them for the
transportation of their children to school. 49 The Court determined that the resolution (and the enabling statute) merely pro46. Lemon, 403 U.S. at 602-03.
47. Resnick v. Eash Brunswick Township Bd. of Educ., 77 N.J. 88, 389
A.2d 944, 954 (1978) ("For an enactment to pass the test of having a secular
purpose, little more is required than a reasonable legislative statement announcing a colorable secular design."). One scholar has noted: "It is not
within the provision of the Court to psychoanalyze any legislation, state or
federal .... In practice the Court has been deferential to mere indicia of a
non-religious purpose found in the statute itself or extracted from its legis-

lative history." L.

MANNING, THE LAw OF CHURCH-STATE RELATIONS

117

(1981). But see Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39 (1980) (per curiam). The Stone
Court struck a Kentucky statute requiring the postihg of the Ten Commandments in the public classroom. Despite the secular purpose expressed in the legislation, the Court found it to be sectarian in purpose and
did not even apply the other two tests. See also Karen B. v. Treen, 653 F.2d
897 (5th Cir. 1981) (striking Louisiana statute permitting voluntary prayer
and meditation, finding unexpressed sectarian purposes), affd mem., 455
U.S. 913 (1982). But see Gaines v. Anderson, 421 F. Supp. 337 (D.C. Mass.
1976) (using the disjunctive coordinator '"prayer 'or' mediation" created a
secular purpose). Contra Opinions of the Justices to the House of Representatives, 387 Mass. 1201, 440 N.E.2d 1159, 1161 (1982) (finding the disjunctive unpersuasive in its analysis).
The intent may be stated in a legislative preamble. See, e.g., Tilton v.
Richardson, 403 U.S. 672, 678 (1971). It may also be judged by the general
unstated purpose of the activity. See, e.g., Johnson, 68 Cal. App.3d at 49, 137
Cal. Rptr. at 12 ("[Ilt is only necessary to observe [the activity] is in the
abstract secular in nature.").
48. 330 U.S. 1 (1947). See generally Choper, The Establishment Clause
and Aid to ParochialSchools, 56 CALrF. L. REV. 260 (1968); Freund, Public
Aid to ParochialSchools, 82 HARv. L. REV. 1680 (1969).
49. The reimbursement was to be paid to parents of both public and
parochial schools. Everson, 330 U.S. at 3. Everson, a taxpayer in the district,
challenged the right of the Board to reimburse parents of parochial students contending that such action violated the establishment clause of the
first amendment, forcing residents, like himself, "to pay taxes to help support and maintain schools dedicated to, and which regularly teach, the
Catholic Faith." Id. at 5.
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vided a general program to help parents get their children to and
from accredited schools.5 0 The resolution did not prefer or discriminate against religious schools. Because the reimbursement payments were not directly disbursed to the schools, the
Court concluded that New Jersey's purpose was not sectarian in
nature.
This type of analysis proposed by Justice Black in parochial-aid cases has been typical. Twenty years later, in Board of
Educationv. Allen,51 Justice White looked to the Everson analysis to determine whether New York's education law, requiring
the state to loan textbooks free of charge to all students in
grades seven to twelve, violated the establishment clause. The
law did not distinguish between students at public or parochial
institutions. 52 The Court concluded that the express purpose of
the law was to further the educational opportunities available to
the young. 53 Holding that only secular books may be loaned, the
Court determined that the statute was completely neutral with
respect to religion.54
Using Everson and Allen as guideposts, the Court has regularly found a secular purpose when the government provides indirect financial aid to religious schools.55 It has not, however,
50. Id. at 18.
51. 392 U.S. 236 (1967). See generally Note, ConstitutionalLau--Establishment Clause of the FirstAmendment-Free Textbook Loans to Pupils in
Private Schools Held Constitutional, 37 FORDHAM L. REV. 123 (1969).
52. Everson, 330 U.S. at 238.
53. Id. at 243.

54. Id. at 248. Another important element in the New York plan was the
fact that title to the books remained with the state and that the loan was
made not to the schools, but to the students. Id. at 243. Thus, the Court
found: "[N]o funds or books are furnished to parochial schools, and the
financial benefit is to the parents and children, not to the schools." Id. at
243-44 (footnote omitted).
55. In Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971), the Court was confronted
with a Pennsylvania statute which provided state funds to nonpublic elementary and secondary schools. The funds Were intended to reimburse the
schools for the cost of their teachers' salaries and for textbook and supplementary instructional material expenditures. Id. at 606-07. While the statute failed one of the other prongs, the Court found the statute to have a
secular purpose. Broadly stated, the statute was "intended to enhance the
quality of the secular education in all schools." Id. at 613. See generally
Gianella, Lemon and Tilton: The Bitter and the Sweet of Church-State Entanglement, 1971 SuP. CT. REV. 147.
In Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672 (1971), the Court examined the
Higher Education Facilities Act of 1963. 20 U.S.C. §§ 711-12 (Supp. 1974).
The Act authorized financial aid in the form of grants and loans to institutions of higher education. An exception excluded "any facility used or to be
used for sectarian instruction or as a place for religious worship, or ... primarily in connection with any part of the program of a school or department
of divinity." Tilton, 403 U.S. at 675. The case called into question grants to
four church-related colleges and universities. The Court found the overall
purpose of the act was to "accommodate rapidly growing numbers of youths
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found secular purposes so regularly in the second category of
cases, the "religious activity in the classroom" controversies.
In School District of Abington Township v. Schempp, 56 the
plaintiff challenged a Pennsylvania statute which required the
reading of the Bible in the classroom. 5 7 The school district contended that the daily exercises were beneficial to all children
regardless of their religious belief. The secular purposes, it argued, were to promote moral values, to contradict the materialistic trends of our times, and to teach the students the heritage of
Judeo-Christian literature.5 8 The Court disagreed. All acts
taken together were inconsistent with the contention that these
exercises had a secular purpose. Instead, their purpose was sectarian and thus in direct violation of the first amendment. 59
While Abington School dealt with required religious exercises, laws allowing voluntary daily religious exercises have
who aspire to a higher education." Id. at 678. The fact that some institutions
were religious did not deter from this overall purpose.
In Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349 (1975), the Court examined another
Pennsylvania program of financial aid to nonpublic schools. This aid was in
the form of auxiliary services-counselling, testing and health services.
Even though the recipients of the services were students at parochial
schools, the Court looked to the overall purpose and found it to be the safeguarding of the children's intellectual development. Id. at 385.
In Roemer v. Board of Pub. Works of Md., 426 U.S. 736 (1976), the Court
upheld a Maryland grant program "to private colleges, among them religiously affiliated institutions, subject only to the instruction that the funds
not be used for 'sectarian purposes.'" Id. at 739. The Court found the secular purpose to be "one of supporting private higher education generally, as
an economic alternative to a wholly public system." Id. at 754.
Most recently, the Court has upheld a New York statute reimbursing
church-sponsored schools for performing various testing and reporting
services required by the State. In Committee for Pub. Educ. v. Regan, 444
U.S. 644 (1980), the Court held that the secular purpose behind the legislative enactment was "to provide educational opportunity of a quality which
will prepare [New York] citizens for the challenges of American life in the
last decades of the twentieth century." Id. at 655. See also Walz v. Tax
Comm'n of N.Y., 397 U.S. 669 (1970) (property tax exemptions to religious
organizations for property used solely for religious purposes upheld).
56. 374 U.S. 203 (1963). Although Abington School chronologically follows the leading case of Engel, it was the first to articulate the secular pur-

pose test.
57. The Court recited the specific law: "[A]t least ten verses from the

Holy Bible shall be read, without comment, at the opening of each public

school on each school day. Any child shall be excused from such Bible
reading or attending such Bible reading, upon the written request of his
parent or guardian." Id. at 205. The companion case of Murray, considered

a Maryland statute which provided for public school opening exercises consisting primarily of the "reading, without comment, of a chapter in the Holy
Bible and/or the use of the Lord's Prayer." Id. at 211.
58. Id. at 223.
59. Id. at 224.
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also failed the secular purpose test. In Jafree v. Wallace,60 a
United States court of appeals examined Alabama's school
prayer statutes. 6 1 Turning to the first prong of the Lemon test
the court simply recognized that prayer is an essentially religious practice. The statutes could therefore serve no secular
purpose. 62 The voluntariness was deemed irrelevant to the
60. 705 F.2d 1526 (11th Cir. 1983). This case is particularly interesting.
Originally the district court granted a preliminary injunction. Jaffree v.
Board of Comm'rs, 544 F. Supp. 727 (S.D. Ala. 1982). After a hearing on the
merits, it dismissed the complaint. Jaffree v. Board of Comm'rs, 554 F.
Supp. 1104 (S.D. Ala. 1983) (mem. opinion). Chief Judge Hand examined
the facts in light of the first amendment decisions the Supreme Court had
made. Id. at 1108-25. He concluded that "the United States Supreme Court
[had] erred in its reading of history." Id. at 1128. The basis for his decision
was that "the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment to the United
States Constitution [did] not prohibit the state from establishing a religion." Id. On February 11, 1983, Justice Powell, acting in his capacity as
Circuit Justice, granted a stay of the judgment pending the petitioner's appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit. Jaifree
v. Board of School Comm'rs, 103 S.Ct. 842 (1983) (mem. opinion). On appeal, a unanimous panel reversed Judge Hand's dismissal order, finding the
statute to be in violation of the establishment clause. Jaffree v. Wallace, 705
F.2d 1520, reh'g denied, 713 F.2d 614 (11th Cir. 1983) (four justices dissenting). See also 129 CONG. REC. S 2704 (daily ed. Mar. 11, 1983) (statements of
Sen. Helms). See generally L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTrrUTIONAL LAw 829
(1978); P. FREUND, THE LEGAL ISSUES IN RELIGION AND THE PUBLIC SCHOOLS
23 (1965); Choper, Religion in The PublicSchools: A ProposedConstitutional
Standard, 47 MINN. L. REV. 329 (1963); Kauper, supra note 10; Note, supra
note 10.
61. The statutes stated:
At the commencement of the first class of each day in all grades in all
public schools, the teacher in charge of the room in which each such
class is held may announce that a period of silence not to exceed one

minute in duration shall be observed for meditation or voluntary
prayer, and during any such period no other activities shall be engaged
in.

Ala. Code § 16-1-20.1 (1982).

From henceforth, any teacher or professor in any public educational
institution within the State of Alabama, recognizing that the Lord God
is one, at the beginning of any homeroom or any class, may lead the
willing students in the following prayer to God:
Almighty God, You alone are our God. We acknowledge You as the
Creator and Supreme Judge of the world. May Your justice, Your truth,
and Your peace abound this day in the hearts of our countrymen, in the
counsels of our government, in the sancity of our homes and in the
classrooms of our schools. In the name of our Lord. Amen.
Ala. Code § 16-1-20.2 (1982). The court found the statutes to be both voluntary and non-denominational. Jaffree, 705 F.2d at 1735.
62. Jaffree, 705 F.2d at 1734. See Karen B., 653 F.2d at 901 (since prayer is
a primarily religious activity in itself, its observance in public school classrooms has an obvious religious purpose), aff'd mem., 102 S.Ct. 1267 (1982).

See also Kent v. Commissioner of Educ., 380 Mass. 235, 402 N.E.2d 1340
(1980). In Kent, the Supreme Court of Massachusetts was asked to declare

unconstitutional a Massachusetts school prayer law. MAss. GEN. LAws ANN.
ch. 71 § IA (West 1979). The Act called for a daily period of prayer offered
by a student volunteer. The court, dealing with the secular purpose, directed attention to the preamble. It focused on the word "prayer" and con-
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court's analysis. Thus, in comparing the two areas of religious
aid to the nonpublic school and religious activity in the public
school, one can see that unless religion is injected into the policy
with which the statute is associated, the secular purpose prong
63
of the tripartite test is easily met.
PrimaryEffect
The second prong of the Lemon test requires that the government policy or law not have as its principal or primary effect
the advancement or the inhibition of religion. It is agreed that
this is the most confusing prong of the Lemon test. 64 The problem is one of definition. The Supreme Court has never defined
"primary effect. ' 65 Without definition, we shall proceed by example. Again, the cases fall into the two categories of financial
state aid to religious activity and religious activity in the
classroom.
As seen above, state aid to religion can take several forms.
Theoretically, any form of financial aid to church-sponsored activity advances religion to some degree. For example, in Bradfield v. Roberts,66 a hospital operated by a religious order
received a federal grant to construct a new building. The grant
was upheld as not advancing religion in spite of the fact that the
hospital was solely operated by a religious order. The Court reasoned that because the hospital's corporate charter required it
to limit its operation to a wholly secular nature, the fact that its
business was conducted by the Roman Catholic Church was
cluded, "[P]rayer is necessarily religious, not secular." 380 Mass. at 238, 402
N.E.2d at 1344. Counsel for the commissioner argued that a prayer "beseeching a secular objective" would suffice for the secular purpose." Id.
The court properly found this unpersuasive. Two years later, the Massachusetts Supreme Court affirmed this decision when responding to questions proposed by the Massachusetts House of Representatives. Opinions
of the Justices, 387 Mass. 1201, 440 N.E.2d 1159 (1982). Concerning the legislation, the court declared, "The purpose of [the bill] is clear-the bill seeks
to encourage the recitation of prayer in schools ....
The effect of the statute would be to return prayer to the public schools. [It would] come into
clear conflict with the prohibition of the Establishment Clause." Id. at 261,
440 N.E.2d at 1162.
63. Comment, Religious Meetings on Public School Property, 15 LoY.
L.A.L. REV. 103, 109 (1981).
64. Treiman, Religion in The Public Schools, 9 N. Ky. L. REV. 229, 238-39
(1982).
65. Justice Powell went so far as to note that "[M]etaphysical judgments [determining the 'principal or primary effect'] are [neither] possible

[nor] necessary." Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 783 at n. 39 (1973). As one author
has commented, "[The Supreme Court] chose instead, to write in converse

terms of that which is nonprimary in effect. From that process, the antonym emerged cloaked in other adjectives, i.e., remote, indirect, independent, incidental." L. MLANNING, supra note 47, at 136.

66. 175 U.S. 291 (1899).
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immaterial. 67
More typical is the state aid given to parochial schools via
bus transportation, textbook loans, and subsidies in the form of
tax exemptions. Chief Justice Burger posited that the focus in
such cases should not be on whether some benefit accrues to
religious institutions as a result of the legislation, but whether
68
its principal or primary effect advances religion.
In Everson v. Board of Education,69 the court examined
New Jersey's bus fare reimbursement program. The plaintifftaxpayer argued that religion is advanced when parents send
their children to religious sponsored schools and receive a monetary reimbursement. Justice Black even speculated that "some
children might not be sent to the church schools if the parents
were compelled to pay their children's bus fare out of their own
pockets ... ."70 The Court, however, analogized the situation to
the state support of church schools which arises from police and
fire protection and other public services. 7 1 The Court concluded
that because the state did not support the schools in these acts,
neither did it in bus fare repayments. Thus, the New Jersey law
did not advance religion.
In Board of Education v. Allen, 72 the Court examined the
primary effect of New York's textbook loan program. Petitioners
contended that religion was advanced by the furnishing of secu73
lar textbooks without charge to students at parochial schools.
The Court even suggested that the provision of free books might
make it more likely that some parents would prefer to send their
children to a sectarian school. 74 The Court reasoned, however,

that religious schools have the dual goals of religious instruction
and secular education. 75 Noting that the religious schools do an
acceptable job of providing their students with a secular education,76 the Court held that free books, like the state-paid fares in
Everson, did not demonstrate an unconstitutional degree of support for a religious institution. 77 Eight years later, the Court declared that many valid legislative programs provide indirect
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.

Id. at 298.
Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 291 (1971). See infra note 78.
330 U.S. 1 (1947).
Id. at 17.
Id. at 17-18.
392 U.S. 236 (1967).
Id. at 240.
Id. at 244.
Id. at 245.
Id. at 248.
Id. at 244.
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incidental benefit to religious institutions. 78
78. "It is clear that not all legislative programs that provide indirect incidental benefit to a religious institution are prohibited by the Constitution.
The problem, like many problems in Constitutional law, is one of degree."
Meek, 421 U.S. at 359 (citations omitted). See Roemer, 426 U.S. at 747 ("Everson andAllen put to rest any argument that the state may never act in such
a way that has the incidental effect of facilitating religious activity."); Hunt
v. McNair, 413 U.S. 734, 743 (1973) (same effect).
In Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672 (1971), the Court held that the federal grants for the construction of libraries, language laboratories and other
secular facilities could be given to church supported colleges and universities. The primary effect of the legislation was not to advance religion. Id. at
679-80. It is important to note that the court was able to separate, in each
school, sectarian activities from secular ones. See id. at 680-82.
Two years later, in Hunt v. McNair, 413 U.S. 734 (1973), when called
upon to judge a similar state program in South Carolina, the Court, upholding the grants, explained: "Aid normally may be thought to have a primary
effect of advancing religion when it flows to an institution in which religion
is so pervasive that a substantial portion of its functions are subsumed into
the religious mission or when it funds a specifically religious activity in an
otherwise substantially secular setting." Id. at 743.
In Committee for Pub. Educ. v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756 (1973), tuition tax
grants were given to low income families with children in parochial schools.
The Court found the amendments to New York's education and tax law to
be ultimately subsidies which would "advance the religious mission of sectarian schools," and went much further than the bus fare reimbursements
of Everson. Id. at 779-80. See also Sloan v. Lemon, 413 U.S. 825 (1973) (same
result with a Pennsylvania enactment). The Nyquist Court hinted that the
legislation did not provide for a strict separation of the funds with a specific
designation for their secular use. A provision of this sort may have passed
judicial scrutiny. 413 U.S. at 774. See Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 299 (1977)
and Committee for Pub. Educ. v. Regan, 444 U.S. 446 (1980), where the Court
upheld the use of public funds for various testing services for church sponsored schools. These tests were not susceptible to religious uses.
In Levitt v. Committee for Pub. Educ., 413 U.S. 783 (1973), New York
appropriated twenty-eight million dollars to reimburse nonpublic schools
for "expenses of services for examination and inspection in connection with
administration, grading and the compiling and reporting of the results of
tests and examinations, maintenance of pupil health records, recording of
personnel qualifications and various other reports." Id. at 474. Referring to
Nyquist, the Court noted similar flaws in the legislation which would have
allowed specifically undesignated money to be used for religious purposes.
The Court also pointed out that the tests which the funds would pay for
would be prepared by "teachers under the authority of religious institutions,. . . drafters, unconsciously or otherwise, to inculcate students in the
religious precepts of the sponsoring church." Id. at 480. The aid was invalidated. Id.
Two years later, in Meek v. Pittinger, 421 U.S. 349 (1975), the Court examined another Pennsylvania state aid program. While it upheld an Allen like loan of textbooks to the students, it invalidated two other forms of support. The first form of aid was a loan of instructional equipment. Rather
than being a loan to the students, the Court found the state to be loaning
the equipment to the schools themselves. Id. at 366. The other form of aid
was "auxiliary services," such as counseling, testing and reporting. Here, as
in Levitt, the Court feared the possibility of misuse, which would allow religion to seep into the institution. Id.
In Roemer v. Board of Pub. Works of Md., 426 U.S. 736 (1976), the Court
examined a Maryland statute providing for public aid given to eligible colleges and universities. The Court determined that the colleges, formally af-

1984]

Bible Study Clubs

Turning to the second category of cases, it should be noted
that when religion enters the classroom door during school
hours, a primary effect of advancement is normally found. This
advancement is better known as sponsorship. 7 9 When the primary effect of the religious activity demonstrates governmental
endorsement or active involvement, the Supreme Court will find
a violation of the establishment clause.
In Illinois ex rel. McCollum v. Board of Education,80 the
Board of Education gave permission to representatives of the
Catholic, Protestant, and Jewish faiths to give religious instruction to willing students once a week in the public school buildings. 8 ' While student participation was voluntary, parental
consent was needed to excuse the student to another classroom
in the school. 82 The Court concluded that the state's tax-sup83
ported buildings were being used to teach religious doctrine.
This was not the separation of church and state envisioned in
the first amendment. 84 The school board's permission, therefore, was terminated.
Four years later the Court examined a similar New York
program in Zorach v. Clauson.85 The Court upheld the New
York system in the most pro-religion opinion it has ever written.
Justice Douglas distinguished Zorach from McCollum as involving neither religious instruction in the public school classrooms
nor the expense of public funds.8 6 The program in Zorach permitted willing students to leave the school grounds during the
school day and go to a classroom or religious institution nearby
filiated with the Roman Catholic Church, were not "pervasively sectarian."
Id. at 755. Moreover, it found that there were stipulations as to the specific

use of the funds-nonsectarian uses. Id. at 759-60.
79. Walz, 397 U.S. at 668.
80. 333 U.S. 203 (1948). See generally Note, The "Released Time" Cases
Revisited: A Study of Group Decisionmaking, 83 YALE L.J. 1202 (1974).
81. These instructors were hired and paid by private religious groups.
McCollum, 333 U.S. at 205.

82. Id. at 207-09.
83. Id. at 212.
84. Id. See Comment, supra note 65, at 110 n. 39 (The presumption was
that the religious program came into the school and that the student who
did not wish to participate bore the burden of removing himself from the

program. In this way, the school condonation of the program produced a
subtle, coercive effect). Also note that appellant contended subtle pressures were brought to bear in the students who sought not to participate.
333 U.S. at 207 n.1. Further, the Court determined the "State's compulsory
public school machinery" was being used by sectarian groups to coersively

provide pupils for their cause. Id. at 212.
85. 343 U.S. 306 (1952). See generally Reed, Church-State and the Zorach
Case, 27 NOTRE DAME LAw. 529 (1952).
86. 343 U.S. at 308-09.
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where the religious instruction was given. 87 Religion was not
advanced, only accommodated. The physical separation of the
religious instruction from the school grounds was a sufficient
buffer to advancement. While questioning the wisdom of such a
program, the Court left its mark of constitutional approval on it.
In Engel v. Vitale, 88 the Court was confronted with New
York's school prayer law. In 1951, the New York State Board of
Regents created the "Regents' Prayer."8 9 The Board of Education directed the school district's principal to have the prayer
recited at the beginning of each school day. Because the prayer
was voluntary, students could be excused entirely from the exercise. 90 The Court reasoned that the primary effect of the exercise was to advance an officially approved religious doctrine by
way of government endorsement. 91 The Court held the practice
unconstitutional and explained that the government could not
participate in such a program without being responsible for a
negative coercive influence on nonparticipating students. 92 The
87. Again, parental consent was required. Id. at 308 n. 1. Those students not released remained in their classroom. Id. at 308. The institutions
were responsible for maintaining attendance. Id. This was the cooperative,
accommodating spirit which touched off the statement: "When the state encourages religious instruction or cooperates with religious authorities by
adjusting the schedules of public events to sectarian needs, it follows the
best of our traditions. For it then respects the religious nature of our people
and accommodates the public service to their spiritual need." Id. at 313-14.
88. 370 U.S. 421 (1962) (6-1 decision; Justices Frankfurter and White did
not take part in the decisions; Justice Stewart dissented). See generally
Sutherland, Establishment According to Engel, 76 HARv. L. REV. 75 (1962).
89. The prayer stated, "Almighty God, we acknowledge our dependence
upon Thee, and we beg Thy blessings upon us, our parents, our teachers,
our teacher and our Country." 370 U.S. at 422. For an interesting look at the
background and national reaction to the Engel decision, see L. BUZZARD,
SCHOOLS: THEY HAVEN'T GOT A PRAYER 40-47 (1982).

90. 370 U.S. at 423 n. 2.
91. The Court admitted that the prayer seemed "relatively insignificant," but pointed to the warning of James Madison:
[I]t is proper to take alarm at the first experiment on our liberties.
* * * Who does not see that the same authority which can establish
Christianity, in exclusion of all other Religions, may establish with the
same ease any particular sect of Christians, in exclusion of all other
Sects? That the same authority which can force a citizen to contribute
three pence only of his property for the support of any one establishment, may force him to conform to any other establishment in all cases
whatsoever?
Id. at 436 (quoting J. Madison, Memorial and Remonstrance against Religious Assessments, 2 THE WRITINGS OF MADISON 183, 185-86 (1901)).

92. "When the power, prestige and financial support of government is
placed behind a particular religious belief, the indirect coercive pressure
upon religious minorities to conform to the prevailing officially approved
religion is plain." Engel, 370 U.S. at 431. Justice Black, writing for the majority, declared that the establishment clause "[miust at least mean that in
this country it is no part of the business of government to compose official
prayers for any group of the American people to recite as part of a religious
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lower federal and state courts have consistently followed this rationale.93 Religious activities simply cannot be accommodated
in the classroom without having a primary effect of
advancement.
Excessive Government Entanglement
The third test, excessive entanglement, has only been applied by the Supreme Court in cases involving financial aid to a
religious activity. 94 The test focuses on the end result of the gov-

program carried on by government." Id. at 430. The facts that the prayer
was termed "non-denominational" and that students could remove themselves from the classroom during its recitation were irrelevant. Id.
On the heels of Engel came Abington School, 374 U.S. 203 (1963). See
supra notes 56-59 and accompanying text. While it was this opinion which
first set forth the primary effect test, the Court did not articulate it (concentrating predominately on the secular purpose aspect of the test). See Abington Steel, 374 U.S. at 222. It seems obvious enough, however, to make the
logical extension that if the recitation of a state written prayer is offensive
to the establishment clause, the daily reading of the Bible and the recitation
of the Lord's Prayer in unison is likewise offensive. Id. at 223. As for religious activity in the classroom, the Court said, there is no such thing as a
"relatively minor encroachment." Id. at 225. Note, however, that in invalidating the religious exercises, the Court reserved judgment on the use of
the Bible or religion "when presented objectively as part of a secular program of education." Id.
93. Stein v. Oshinsky, 348 F.2d 999 (2d Cir.) (ban on student-initiated,
voluntary prayer upheld), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 957 (1965); Karen B. v.
Treen, 653 F.2d 897 (5th Cir. 1981) (Louisiana prayer statute declared unconstitutional), affid mem., 102 S. Ct. 1267 (1982); Kent v. Commissioner of
Educ., 380 Mass. 235, 402 N.E. 1340 (1980) (Massachusetts prayer statute declared unconstitutional); Commissioner of Educ. v. School Comm. of Leyden, 358 Mass. 776, 267 N.E.2d 226 (voluntary religious exercises enjoined),
cert. denied, 404 U.S. 849 (1971). See also Opinions of the Justices, 387 Mass.
1201, 440 N.E.2d 1159 (1982) (advising the Massachusetts House of Representatives as to the unconstitutionality of proposed "silent moment" bill).
Contra Reed v. Van Hoven, 237 F. Supp. 48 (W.D. Mich. 1965) (allowing students to pray before classes begin).
94. This third prong of the establishment test originated in Walz v. Tax
Comm'n of N.Y., 397 U.S. 664 (1970). In Walz, the Court was confronted with
a taxpayer who sought to enjoin the New York City Tax Commissioner from
granting property tax exemptions to religious organizations. It determined
the legislative purpose of granting tax exemptions to all nonprofit, quasipublic corporations was secular in nature, and declared the primary effect
to be neither sponsorship nor inhibition. Id. at 672-76. In its creation of the
entanglement issue, the Court noted that elimination of the exemption
would expand the administrative involvement of church and state. Id. at

674. It would do so by "giving rise to tax valuation of church property, tax

liens, tax foreclosures, and the direct confrontations and conflicts that follow on the train of those legal processes." Id. "[T]he questions are
whether the involvement is excessive, and whether it is a continuing one
calling for official and continuing surveillance leading to an impermissible
degree of entanglement." Id. at 675. The Court concluded that the continued exemption would not create excessive entanglement. The decision ultimately hinged on the historical aspect of Church exemptions. "It appears
that at least up to 1885 this Court reflecting more than a century of our history and uninterrupted practices, accepted without discussion the proposi-
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ernment legislation. "The test," Chief Justice Burger said, "is
' 95
inescapably one of degree.
In Lemon v. Kurtzman,96 the Court found Pennsylvania's
Nonpublic Elementary and Secondary Education Act 97 to have
both a secular purpose and a primary effect which did not advance or inhibit religion.9 8 The Court then examined the resulting relationship between the state and the religious schools. 99
The state-aid of partial teacher salary reimbursement was to be
limited to courses offered in the public schools and materials approved by state officials. 100 The Court reasoned that the restrictions and surveillance necessary for teachers to play a strictly
non-ideological role give rise to entanglements between church
and state. 10 1 A continuing relationship comprised of audits, accountings, inspections, and evaluations would be a state of impermissible excessive entanglement. 0 2 The Court, therefore,
held that the program violated the establishment clause.
It is important to note that the relationship between state
and church after the legislation is enacted is not required to be
as simple and as uninvolved as before it was enacted. The
Lemon test looks for excessive entanglement. Some entanglement is permissible and most legislation will necessarily leave
the relationship between church and state more complicated
and involved than before. 0 3
tion that federal and state grants of tax exemptions to churches were not a
violation of the Religion Clauses of the First Amendment." Id. at 680.
95. Id. at 674.
96. 403 U.S. 602 (1970). See supra note 55.
97. PA. STAT. ANN., Tit. 24, §§ 5601-5609 (Supp. 1971) (repealed 1977).
98. 403 U.S. at 613-14.

99. The Court set forth the areas to examine. "In order to determine

whether the government entanglement with religion is excessive, we must
examine the character and purposes of the institutions that are benefited,
the nature of the aid that the State provides, and the resulting relationship
between the government and the religious authority." Id. at 615.

100. Id. at 621. The program provided for direct payments to the religious

institutions. Id. This, the Court determined, would result in "a relationship
pregnant with involvement and . . .could encompass sustained and detailed administrative relationships for enforcement of statutory or administrative standards ...... Id. (quoting Walz, 397 U.S. at 675).
101. 403 U.S. at 620-21.
102. Id. at 621-22.
103. See, e.g., Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672, 687 (1970) (inspections
necessary to determine that the facilities are devoted to similar education
are minimal and not excessively entangling). The area which is most susceptible to excessive entanglement is that where the government is involved in a "comprehensive, discriminating, and continuing state [of]
surveillance." Tilton, 403 U.S. at 621-23. In non-financial aid cases, the "surveillance" problem would be described as a "supervision" problem. See

Brandon, 635 F.2d at 974 (2d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1123 (1982).
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BORDER CHECK AT THE BIBLE STUDY CLUBS

Six courts have applied the Lemon test to the issue of Bible
study clubs in public high schools. 10 4 In all but one case 0 5 the
courts have held that the existence of Bible study clubs in the
public schools is an unconstitutional violation of the establishment clause.
This comment examines each case
chronologically.
In Hunt v. Board of Education,106the Board prohibited high
school students from voluntarily meeting on school premises as
a prayer and Bible study group. 0 7 The plaintiff students alleged
a denial of freedom of speech, freedom of assembly, and the free
exercise of religious beliefs. 10 8 Making no reference to the three
part Lemon test, the Court relied on decisions prohibiting
schools from renting out their facilities to the public for regular
religious meetings and summarily dismissed the complaint. 10 9
The court held that separation of church and state allowed
school authorities to make this prohibition. 10
In Johnson v. Huntington Beach Union High School District,"' the school refused to permit a voluntary Bible study
club to meet on the campus. The district had a policy which dis112
tinguished between sponsored clubs and recognized clubs.
The students wanted only to be recognized, not sponsored. The
procedure they had to follow was to apply to the district and receive its approval."13 On January 8, 1974, the district passed an
interim policy allowing religious clubs to meet on campus.
When the Orange County legal counsel informed the district
that it was unconstitutional to permit such activity, the district
104. See cases cited supra note 13.
105. Bender v. Williamsport Area School Dist., 563 F. Supp. 697 (M.D. Pa.
1983).
106. 321

F.

Supp. 1263 (S.D. W.Va. 1971) (mem. order).

107. The School district's policy was to uniformly deny all requests for
the use of school buildings for religious purposes. Id. at 1264.
108. Id. at 1263.
109. State ex rel. Greisinger v. Grand Rapids Board of Educ., 88 Ohio

App. 364, 100 N.E.2d 294 (1949), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 820 (1950) (forbidding
Jehovah Witnesses from using a public school auditorium for public religious meetings). The court also referred to 47 Am. Jtrn. SCHOOLS § 213, a
section referring to using a school as a place of meetings. Hunt, 321 F. Supp.
at 1264.

110. Hunt, 321 F. Supp. at 1264.
111. 68 Cal. App. 3d 1, 137 Cal. Rptr. 43, cert. denied, 434 U.S. 877 (1977).
See generally Buchanan, Accomodation of Religion in the Public Schools: A
Pleafor Careful Balancingof Competing ConstitutionalValues, 28 UCLA L.
REV. 1000, 1025-46 (1981).

112. Johnson, 68 Cal. App. 3d at 6 n. 3, 137 Cal. Rptr. at 45 n. 3.
113. Id. at 7, 137 Cal. Rptr. at 45-6.
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rescinded its resolution." 4 Over one hundred students petitioned for formal recognition of a religious club. The district rejected the petition. The students then filed suit requesting
injunctive and declaratory relief. The lower court held such relief would cause a breach in the wall between church and
state." 5 On appeal the students contended their club was entitled to both recognition and use of the school's facilities just as
other student organizations." 6 In applying the Lemon test, the
Johnson court noted the secular purpose test was difficult to apply."

7

The court invalidated the policy, however, finding that it

violated the second and third prong of the test. Because the
club held its meetings on the school campus, the court concluded that the financial assistance of free use of school facilities, classrooms, heat, and light would impermissibly advance
religion." 8 The court also determined that to recognize the
group would place an "imprimatur on the religious activity." 119
As for the excessive entanglement prong, the court focused on
the administrative sponsorship which the school would be required to provide. The court anticipatea that the school would
need to approve activities, oversee the club's financial accounts,
and review the club's membership. Such acts, the court determined, would foster excessive entanglement. 20 The divided
court therefore held that a policy of accommodation of this sort
would overstep constitutional limits and make the state a party
121
to an impermissible establishment of religion.
114. Id., 137 Cal. Rptr. at 46.
115. To allow the students declaratory relief would "cause the state to
penetrate the federal and state barriers between church and state." Id. at 8,
137 Cal. Rptr. at 46 (footnote omitted).
116. Id. at 8 n.7, 137 Cal. Rptr. at 47 n.7.
117. Id. at 12, 137 Cal. Rptr. at 49. The Court properly focused the first

prong of the test on the overall policy: the "power to permit student organizations to conduct their activities on school campuses during the school
day." Id.
118. Id. at 12, 137 Cal. Rptr. at 49.
119. Id. at 12-13, 137 Cal. Rptr. at 49.
120. Id. at 14, 137 Cal. Rptr. at 49. The court also noted a possibility for
political divisiveness which might have a coercive effect on members of less
orthodox religions who would have insufficient support to form a club. Id.
121. The strongly worded dissent by Justice McDaniel, pointed out that
recognition of the club would not be the affirmative sponsorship warned of

in McCollum, Engel, and Abington School. Johnson, 68 Cal. App. 3d at 21,
137 Cal. Rptr. at 55. He criticized the majority for their "misconception of
what 'sponsorship' by the school actually entailed," id. at 23, 137 Cal. Rptr.
at 56, and argued for an accommodation as permitted under Zorach. As to
the primary effect, McDaniel turned to Hunt and Lemon and contended, "If
the state can permissibly lend the massive power of its treasurer in aid of a
sectarian institution to help finance the construction of educational facilities, it seems that to allow a group of high school students to use school
rooms to discuss the Bible is well within the rule. . . ." Johnson, 68 Cal.

App. 3d at 29, 137 Cal. Rptr. at 60. McDaniel lamented,
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One year later, in Trietley v. Board of Education of the City
of Buffalo,122 the New York Supreme Court, Appellate Division
affirmed the dismissal of several students' petitions to compel
the Board to permit the formation of Bible study clubs on campus. In denying the students recognition afforded to other recognized clubs, the court applied the Lemon test. Concerning the
first prong, the court focused on the narrow issue and asked
whether the formation of Bible study clubs would constitute a
secular purpose. It found the purpose to be religious. 23 The
court described the primary effect of such formation as the "ad124
vancement of religious philosophy contained in the Bible."'
Regarding the excessive entanglements, the court found that
without constant supervision, the Bible clubs could become exclusively sectarian classes in religious instruction within the
public supported school system.' 25 The court concluded that inasmuch as the Board had never permitted any other religious
club to form, plaintiffs' rights to equal protection were not
126
infringed.
In Brandon v. Board of Education of Guilderland School
District,127 the federal circuit court affirmed the dismissal of a
student's petition for injunctive and declaratory relief against
the school district for the refusal to allow a prayer group to meet
on school grounds. 128 Applying the Lemon test, the court found
the secular purpose of a policy granting student groups access to
school facilities to be the encouragement of extracurricular acI see the necessity for a reevaluation of the cases construing the Establishment Clause. With due respect for the sincerity of those who have
authored the cases relied upon by the majority, it seems to me that
their sweeping interpretations of the simple phrase ...have distorted
all out of rational proportion both what the framers of the Constitution
intended and what is fundamental to the survival of an ethical society.
Id. at 30, 137 Cal. Rptr. at 60-61. It is interesting to note that in his dissent to
reverse the lower court's holding, Justice McDaniel announced: "Lest this
tract be construed by anyone to be an artfully disguised effort to promote
and advance the teachings of the Bible, let it be known that I am an ardent
and practicing Buddist and a member of the Nichiren Shoshi Shoka Gakkai." Id. at 35 n. 10, 137 Cal.Rptr. at 64 n. 10.
122. 65 A.D.2d 1, 409 N.Y.S.2d 912 (1978).
123. Trietley, 65 A.D.2d at 6, 409 N.Y.S.2d at 916.

124. Id. It also referred to the rent-free facilities which would be used by
the students. Id. at 6, 409 N.Y.S.2d at 917.
125. Id. at 7, 409 N.Y.S.2d at 917.
126. Id.
127. 635 F.2d 971 (2d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1123 (1982).

128. While the district court found an unstated secular purpose to the
meetings it dismissed the complaint because the request failed to pass the
second and third tests. Id. at 974. The primary effect was the advancement
of religion; excessive entanglement was found in the "faculty surveillance

[needed] to assure the meetings were voluntary." Id.
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tivities. 129 Struggling with the primary effect test, the court concluded that the symbolic inference of state imprimatur in
religious activity was too dangerous to permit. 130 To the impressionable student, religion would appear to be advanced.' 3 ' The
student's request failed the excessive entanglement test because teachers would be required to monitor the activities and
insure that participation would always remain voluntary. 132 To
the student's claim that she was not equally protected, the court
responded that a high school is not a public forum where religious views could be freely aired. 133 In short, the student's religious speech and association rights were "severely
circumscribed
by the Establishment Clause in the public school
''
setting. 34

In 1982, the first decision following the landmark case of
Widmar v. Vincent 135 appeared. In Lubbock Civil Liberties
Union v. Lubbock Independent School District,136 the federal
circuit court was called to examine a school district policy which
expressly provided students with the right to form Bible clubs.
The district court had found the policy to be constitutional. 137 In
applying the Lemon test, the court of appeals chose to focus on
the narrow purpose of the school's policy of recognition of Bible
study clubs. 138 The court determined that the new policy granting equal rights to religious clubs was not secular because it was
129. Id. at 978 (referring to Chess v. Widmar, 635 F.2d 1217 (8th Cir. 1980)

(coming to the same conclusion on the university campus), and Johnson v.
Huntington Beach Union High School Dist., 68 Cal. App. 3d 1, 137 Cal. Rptr.

43 (high school), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 877 (1977)).
130. Brandon, 635 F.2d at 978.
131. Id.
132. Id. at 979.
133. Id. at 908.

134. Id.
135. 454 U.S. 263 (1982) (upholding the right of a Bible club to exist in the
public university context). See infra notes 158-71 and accompanying text.
136. 669 F.2d 1038 (5th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 103 S.Ct. 800 (1983). The
school board intended to recognize religious clubs and extend to them the
benefits afforded other groups. Specifically, the controverted section of the
new policy stated:
4. The School Board permits students to gather at the school with supervision either before or after regular school hours on the same basis
as other groups as determined by the school administration to meet for
any educational, moral, religious or ethical purposes so long as attendance at such meetings is voluntary.
Id. at 1041 n.7.
137. The district court stated that the purpose was to "encourage leadership, communication skills, and social awareness by allowing the voluntary
association of students for educational, moral, religious, or ethical purposes." Id. at 1044. It pointed to Brandon, 635 F.2d at 978, for the proposition that a secular purpose can be found in recognizing Bible clubs. 669 F.2d
at 1044.

138. Lubbock Civil Liberties Union, 669 F.2d at 1044.
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designed to allow religious clubs to meet. 3 9 Regarding the primary effect of the policy, the court focused on the imprimatur
which would be placed on religious clubs by school district recognition. The court concluded that the impressionable student
might see the clubs as integrally related to the district's extracurricular programs 4° The court concluded the policy's principle effect was the advancement of religion.' 4 ' As to the
excessive entanglement test, the court relied on Brandon for the
proposition that continual supervision of students creates entanglement. 142 The court concluded that the policy failed each
143
of the three prongs of the Lemon test.
Bender v. Williamsport Area School District,'" the most recent case to examine Bible clubs in the public high school, is the
only case to uphold their constitutionality. In September of
1981, the plaintiff and several students requested permission
from the principal of the Williamsport Area High School to form
145
a club which would meet during the activity period of the day.
The club would be religious in nature, promoting spiritual
growth and positive attitudes. 14 After discussing the matter
with the superintendent of the district and receiving a legal
opinion from the School District Solicitor, the principal denied
the request. 14 7 The students appealed to the School Board
which affirmed the principal's action. 14 The students then filed
suit in district court. The court held that while the plaintiff's
139. Id. at 1045.
140. Id. The court quoted Brandon, 635 F.2d at 978 for the proposition
that the appearance of secular involvement in religious activity, indicating
state approval, is too dangerous to permit. The misapprehension is compounded by the fact that the clubs met "at a time closely associated with
the school day." Lubbock Civil Liberties Union, 669 F.2d at 1046. The school
district argued that the clubs would meet before or after the regular school
hours. They would even meet before or after the school busses run. Id.
The court responded that the meeting times of the clubs relative to the bus
schedules was immaterial. Id.
141. Lubbock Civil Liberties Union, 669 F.2d at 1046.
142. Id. at 1047 (referring to Brandon, 635 F.2d at 979). The school district
had admitted that it would supervise the students pursuant to state law.
143. Lubbock Civil Liberties Union, 669 F.2d at 1048.
144. 563 F. Supp. 697 (M.D. Pa. 1983).

145. Id. at 700. The club was to be called Petros, a greek word meaning

'"The Rock." W.

BAUER, W. ARNDT & F. GINGRICH, A GREEK-ENGLISH LEXICON OF THE NEW TESTAMENT 660 (4th rev. ed. 1957). It refers to Jesus' re-

sponse to his disciple Peter when Peter confessed Jesus' divine sonship.
Referring to the confession, Jesus said, "You are Peter and upon this Rock I

will build my church and the gates of Hades shall not prevail against it."
Matt. 16:18. See W. ALLEN, A CRITICAL AND EXEGETICAL COMMENTARY ON
THE GOSPEL ACCORDING TO S. MATTHEW 176 (3d ed. 1912).

146. Bender, 563 F. Supp. at 701. The organization was to be nondenominational. Participation was to be voluntary. Id.
147. Id.
148. Id.
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free exercise rights were not violated by the defendant's action,
her free speech rights were violated. 149 Relying on the Supreme
Court's declaration in Widmar that religious speech is entitled
to constitutional protection, the court concluded that the activity
period created by the school was a forum generally open for use
by students.'5 0 The court found that a content-based exclusion
of speech, while permissible under certain circumstances, must
surpass a compelling state interest test.'5 ' The only state interest which the school board proposed was its mandate to not vio152
late the establishment clause.
In applying the Lemon test, the court found a secular purpose to an activity period which would include religious clubs in
the promotion of "intellectual, physical and social development
of its students.' ' 53 Under the second test, the court found that
the primary effect of the policy was not the advancement of religion, but its accommodation. The court determined that Williamsport High School had over twenty-five other groups
utilizing the activity period expressing a wide variety of interests. Therefore, the court concluded that treating the Bible club
like the many other clubs would confer only a general benefit
upon it rather than furthering its aims.1 54 The court was unpersuaded by the school's concern that the students might misapprehend the school's actions and see a state imprimatur on the
group. 5 5 Concerning excessive entanglement, the court found
that the supervision required would be no more than the taking
of attendance and the maintenance of order. 5 6 This would not
excessively entangle the state and church. 5 7
149. Id. at 704.
150. Id. at 704 n. 8. See Widmar, 454 U.S. at 269 (religious speech is constitutionally protected).
151. Bender, 563 F. Supp. at 707.
152. Id.
153. Id. at 709.
154. Id. at 711. Cf.Widmar, 454 U.S. at 274. ('The forum is available to a
broad class of non-religious as well as religious speakers; there are over 100
recognized student groups at UMKC. The provision of benefits to so broad

a spectrum of groups is an important index of secular effect.").
155. "While this case does not involve students of the college age, neither
does it involve children in the primary grades." Bender, 563 F. Supp. at 712.
156. The court determined "that there would be no more supervision
than that which the state properly provided in securing the safety, security
and general convenience for persons attending the celebration of Mass with
the Pope at the National Mall. Id. at 715 (referring to O'Hair v. Andrus, 613
F.2d 931 (D.C. Cir. 1979)). See also Roemer, 426 U.S. at 747 (the state properly provides government services like fire and police protection at no
charge to religious groups).
157. The district court noted that its holding was a narrow one."The court
merely holds that under the precise set of undisputedfacts presented, the

defendants have created an open forum for the students' use, have excluded the plaintiffs by reason of their speech, and have not demonstrated
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WIDMAR V. VINCENT: BORDER SECURED AT THE PUBLIC
UNIVERSITY

In Widmar v. Vincent, 5 8 the Supreme Court upheld, for the
first time, the right of a religious club to coexist with other campus clubs. The controversy took place at the University of Missouri at Kansas City. In 1977, a campus-registered religious
group named Cornerstone was denied use of the university
buildings. The grounds for the denial were found in the university regulations prohibiting the use of school facilities by religious groups. 159 When Cornerstone challenged the regulations,
the federal district court upheld the university's policy and
granted the university summary judgment. 160 The court of appeals rejected the district court's analysis and held that religious speech, like other speech, is protected by the first
amendment. 161 The court of appeals determined that for the university to exclude Cornerstone it must have a compelling state
that the Establishment Clause requires such discrimination." Bender, 563
F. Supp. at 716 (emphasis in original).
158. 454 U.S. 263 (1981) (8-1 decision; White, J., dissenting).
159. The policy specifically required:
No University buildings or grounds . . . may be used for purposes of

religious worship or religious teaching by either student or nonstudent
groups.... The prohibition against use of University buildings and
grounds for religious worship or religious teaching is a policy required,
in the opinion of the Board of Curators, by the Constitution and laws of
the State and is not open to any other construction.
Id. at 265-66 n. 3.
160. Chess v. Widmar, 480 F. Supp. 907 (W.D. Mo. 1979), rev'd, 635 F.2d
1310 (8th Cir. 1980), affd sub nom. Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263 (1981).
The court found the policy to be not only reasonable, but required by the
establishment clause. Id. at 916. In applying the Lemon test, the district
court found the first and third factor would allow Cornerstone to meet in
the buildings. Id. at 914. Concerning the secular purpose test, the court
state, "[a] university policy that permitted any student group to meet in
university-owned buildings for any purpose would aid all student groups,
regardless of religious affiliation and would, therefore, reflect a clear secular
purpose." Id. (emphasis in original). Concerning the third part of the test,
the court concluded that "entanglement with religion would be completely
avoided" since this secular policy "would make no distinction between
groups or their purposes." Id. The second test, however, was found to bar
the group. "This Court finds that a university policy permitting regular religious services in university-owned buildings would have the primary effect
of advancing religion." Id. at 915-16. The court further cited the proposition
that the state could not allow the religious student group to use the buildings without lending impermissible aid to religion. Chess, 480 F. Supp. at
915 (citing Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672, 680-82 (1971)). The students
argued that their activities, which admittedly included worship and religious teaching, constituted a form of speech which was being discriminated
against. Id. The court dismissed this argument distinguishing religious
speech from the first amendment protected right to speak. Id. at 918.
161. Chess v. Widmar, 635 F.2d 1310 (8th Cir. 1980), af#id sub nom.
Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263 (1981).
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interest. 62 The court held that no such interest existed and
granted Cornerstone the right to coexist with other campus
organizations.163
The Supreme Court viewed the case as discrimination by
the university against religious speech.'6 It pointed out that
the university had created a forum for use by the student groups
and yet excluded those groups whose activity included religious
for exclusion (the esspeech. 165 The university's justification
166
insufficient.
was
clause)
tablishment
In applying the Lemon test, the Widmar Court approved of

the circuit court's reasoning and conclusions. 67 The secular
purpose was the creation of a forum in which students could exchange ideas. The primary effect of the policy was not the inhibition or advancement of religion; it merely advanced the
exchange of ideas. The entanglement of the state and religion
would be minimal because the state would not be called upon to
do more than monitor the group. The Court further discussed
a
the second test of primary effect. It termed the benefits which 68
religious student group would receive as merely incidental.
The Court pointed out that "an open forum in a public univer162. The university claimed that the compelling state interest was that to
act otherwise would violate the establishment clause. Id.
163. The appellate court agreed with the district court's analysis of the
first and third prong of the Lemon test. See supra note 156. It could not

agree, however, that the primary effect of advancing religion was a necessary conclusion. It found that the policy would have the primary effect of

not advancing religion, but of advancing the "University's admittedly secular purpose-to develop students' 'social and cultural awareness as well as
[their] intellectual curiosity.'" Chess, 635 F.2d at 1317. Under such a policy
the university would not be sponsoring religious activity, groups like Cornerstone would be the actual sponsors. The university's role would be de
minimus.

The appellate court further corrected the district court's understanding

of Tilton. Tilton was concerned, the court instructed, with control, not use,
of a university buildings. Id. at 1319. Here, there was no question but that
the university would retain control. Id.
164. Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 267 (1981).
165. Id.
166. Id. at 270-76. "It does not follow . . . that an 'equal access' policy
would be incompatible with this Court's Establishment Clause cases." Id.
at 271.
167. Id. at 271-72 & n. 10.
168. Id. at 274. The Supreme Court further stated:
We are not oblivious to the range of an open forum's likely effects. It
is possible-perhaps even foreseeable-that religious groups will benefit from access to University facilities. But this Court has explained
that a religious organization's enjoyment of merely "incidental" benefits does not violate the prohibition against the "primary advancement"
of religion.
Id. at 273-74 (citations omitted).
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sity does not confer any imprimatur of State approval,"' 169 and
likened the extension of general benefits to those of the public
services the state already provides for churches and religious
educational institutions in the way of fire and police protection. 170 The Court concluded:
Having created a forum generally open to student groups, the University seeks to enforce a content-based exclusion of religious
speech. Its exclusionary policy violates the fundamental principle
that a state regulation of speech should be content-neutral, and the
conUniversity is unable to
171justify this violation under applicable
stitutional standards.
For these reasons, Cornerstone was accorded the full benefits
given to every other student group on the campus of the University of Missouri at Kansas City.
BORDER ESTABLISHMENT AT THE HIGH SCHOOL

In Widmar, the Supreme Court expressly reserved the
question whether an establishment clause defense would preclude application of its holding to the public high school. 172 The
Court also was not confronted with the question of whether the
existence of an activity period for various clubs created an open
forum at the high school level. What it did not reserve, however,
was its conclusion that speech about religion and actual worship
are protected forms of speech.' 73 It is therefore proper to consider the concept of freedom of speech in the schools.
While school boards admittedly have the responsibility of
managing the classrooms, they may not manage them in such a
way as to violate a student's constitutional rights. 174 Generally,
absent a specific showing of constitutionally valid reasons to
regulate speech, students may freely express their views.' 75 As
169. Id. at 274.
170. Id. at 274-75.
171. Id. at 277. The dissent of Justice White focused on the proposition
that religious worship is not a protected form of speech. Id. at 284. He
would allow a university to permit its buildings to be used for religious

clubs, but he would not require it. Id. at 282.
172. Id. at 262 n. 14.
173. Id. at 269 & n. 6.
174. See Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community School Dist., 393 U.S.
503 (1969); West Virginia St. Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943)
(allowing unwilling students to excuse themselves from the recitation of
the pledge of allegiance to the flag). See generally Note, ConstitutionalIm-

plications of Compulsory Flag Salute Statutes, 12 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 70
(1943).
175. Tinker, 393 U.S. at 511. See generally Diamond, The First Amendment and Public Schools: The Case Against JudicialIntervention, 59 TEx. L.
REV. 477 (1981); Tushnet, Free Expression and the Young Adult: A Constitutional Framework, 1976 U. ILL. L.F. 746; Note, ConstitutionalRights of High
School Students, 23 DRAKE L. REV. 403 (1974). This proposition, however, is
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discussed earlier, the school board of Des Moines, Iowa could
not interfere with its armband-wearing students' expression of
pure speech against the Viet Nam war. 176 The courts have even
encouraged student expression in the public high schools, entitling them to relief when the school authorities have attempted
to suppress views disseminated through the high school newspaper.177 In Zucker v. Panitz, one such case, the court referred
to Tinker and declared that free speech rights for students
should not be confined to classroom discussion:
The principal use to which the schools are dedicated is to accommodate students during prescribed hours for the purpose of certain
types of activities. Among those activities is personal intercommunication among the students. This is not only an inevitable part of
the process of attending school. It is also an important part of the
rights therefore, do not embrace
educational process. A student's
1 78
merely the classroom hours.

This is particularly true when a school creates a forum for its
students by providing time and space for clubs and activities.
Personal intercommunication flourishes in these marketplaces
of ideas. While the school has not created a traditional public
forum,

79

it has created a limited public forum for its students. 8 0

subject to the same restrictions placed on speech by adults. See Cox. v.
Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536 (1965). 'The rights of free speech and assembly,
while fundamental in our democratic society, still do not mean that everyone with opinions or beliefs to express may address a group at any public
place and at any time." Id. at 554.
It is naive to argue that the rights of students are totally identical to the
rights of adults. Such has never been the case. See, e.g., Nicholson v. Board
of Educ., 682 F.2d 858, 863 (9th Cir. 1982) (students' rights are not coextensive with those of adults). Yet students do have rights. Tinker, 393 U.S. at
506. A model for entrusting these rights to students in a progressive fashion
is provided by Professor Ladd. Ladd, Civil Libertiesfor Students-At What
Age?, 3 J. LAw & EDUC. 251 (1974). He argues for endowing the citizens'
rights as the student matures in gradual steps. Id. at 255. In the school,

contractual agreements would be made between the teachers and their
students.
176. See authorities cited supra note 4.
177. Zucker v. Panitz, 299 F. Supp. 102 (S.D.N.Y. 1969).
178. Id. at 105 (quoting Tinker, 393 U.S. at 512).
179. A public forum is a place where citizens may freely assemble and
express their views. See generally Perry Educ. Ass'n. v. Perry Local Educators Ass'n., 103 S. Ct. 948 (1983); International Society for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. New Jersey Sports and Exposition Auth., 691 F.2d 155 (3d
Cir. 1982); Kalven, The Concept of Public Forum: Cox v. Louisiana, 1965
SuP. CT. REV. 1; Stone, ForaAmericana: Speech in Public Places, 1974 Sup.
CT. REV. 233.
Traditional public forums include city streets, parks and sidewalks,
Hague v. CIO, 307 U.S. 496 (1939), municipal theatres and auditoriums,
Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546 (1975), and state capitol grounds, Edwards v. South Carolina, 372 U.S. 229 (1963). 'The primary
factor in determining whether property owned or controlled by the government is a public forum is how the locale is used." InternationalSociety for
Krishna Consciousness, 691 F.2d at 160. The rule as to forums is that once
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Once a right t" speech has been established in an open forum, it is essential to determine how that right can be regulated.
Unquestionably such regulation must be reasonable. Where the
speech causes disturbance or coersion it may be regulated. 181
Where it would cause interference with the forum's purpose, it
may be restricted. 182 When speech cannot be practically accoman area "is opened up to assembly or speaking by some groups, government

may not prohibit others from assembling or speaking on the basis of what
they intend to say. Selective exclusions from a public forum may not be
based on content alone. . . ." Police Dept. of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92,
96 (1972) (declaring unconstitutional a city ordinance prohibiting peaceful
picketing within 150 feet of schools). See also Bonner-Lyons v. School
Comm. of Boston, 480 F.2d 442 (1st Cir. 1973). "[0 ] nce a forum is opened for
the expression of views, regardless of how unusual the forum,. . . [no] censor may pick and choose between those views which may or may not be
expressed." Id. at 444.
180. The Supreme Court defined a limited public forum as a category of
public property which is not by tradition or designation a forum for public
communication. Perry Educ. Ass'n, 103 S.Ct. at 955. In dicta, the Third Circuit recently declared, "Since the exchange of ideas is an essential part of
the education process, but the need for discipline and order is great, a public high school is probably a limited forum also." InternationalSocietyfor
Krishna Consciousness,Inc., 691 F.2d at 160. Accord Bender v. Wiliamsport
Area School Dist., 563 F. Supp. 697, 705 (M.D. Pa. 1983). Contra Brandon v.
Board of Educ., 635 F.2d 971 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1123 (1981);

Lubbock Civil Liberties Union v. Lubbock Indep. School Dist., 669 F.2d 1038

(5th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 103 S.Ct. 800 (1983).
The Brandon court's rejection of the limited public forum argument
rested on a line of lower court cases which led to the conclusion that "Establishment Clause considerations limit [a student's] right to air religious
doctrines." 635 F.2d at 980. With the Supreme Court's later proclamation
that religious speech is protected and that the establishment clause is not a
necessary bar to accomodation, Brandon's foundation crumbled. It's holding that "the students' free speech and associational rights, cognizable in a
'public forum,' are severely circumscribed by the Establishment Clause in
the public school setting," now stands refuted by Widmar. The rejection of
the public forum doctrine by the Fifth Circuit in Lubbock Civil Liberties
Union is also meaningless. The only foundation for its rejection was the
Brandon holding. Lubbock Civil Liberties Union, 669 F.2d at 1048. See generally Nahmod, Beyond Tinker: The High School as an EducationalPublic
Forum, 5 HARv.C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 278 (1970).
181. Tinker, 393 U.S. at 508-09; Burnside v. Byars, 363 F.2d 744, 749 (5th
Cir. 1966); Blackwell v. Issaquena Cty. Bd. of Educ., 363 F.2d 749 (5th Cir.
1966) (companion case of Burnside; here the court upheld the school's action of prohibiting students from wearing freedom buttons because of the
great disturbances which were created).
182. See Jones v. North Carolina Prisoner's Labor Union, Inc., 433 U.S.
119 (1977) (upholding prison regulations which restricted prisoners' freedom of association and free speech rights). The prisoners' freedom to
speak was required to be "consistent with the inmates' status as prisoners
and with the legitimate operational considerations of the institution." Id. at
130. Compare Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104 (1972) (loud demonstration interfered with purpose of public school-atmosphere of silence for
reading) with Brown v. Louisiana, 383 U.S. 131 (1966) (silent vigil protest
allowed in library; no interference with public library's purpose).
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modated, it may be regulated.18 3 In Bible club cases there is no
contention that a disturbance would be caused by their existence. Neither is there any interference with the school's purpose. The clubs would certainly be regulated just as the other
184
school organizations are regulated.
The blockade against religious speech which the high school
boards have attempted to erect has been the establishment
clause. The contention is that religious speech may be restricted because of the establishment clause. 8 5 Consequently
the three pronged Lemon test must be applied to examine
clubs are the type of religious speech that will be
whether Bible
1 86
restricted.
The first prong of the test examines the purpose of a proposed state action which would involve religion. Widmar has
shown that the primary focus of the test addresses the broader
scope of the action and not just the narrow scope of the proposed policy.18 7 The Supreme Court approved of the district
court's analysis: "A [neutral] university policy that permitted
any student group to meet in university-owned buildings for
any purpose would aid all student groups, regardless of religious affiliation .... "188

This analysis, applied to the high

189
school context, results in the same conclusion.
The second prong of the test asks whether the primary effect of the new program advances or inhibits religion. The fear
is that symbolic sponsorship or direct financial aid may be construed as an advancement of religion. 190 Widmar declared the
benefits accorded a religious club in a university setting to be

183. See, e.g., Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. at 554-55. "[One could not] insist
upon a street meeting in the middle of Times Square at the rush hour as a
form of freedom of speech or assembly. Governmental authorities have the
duty and responsibility to keep their streets open and available for movement." Id.
184. It is interesting that the plaintiff suggested that her Bible club could
be allotted even fewer benefits than other school clubs. Bender, 563 F.
Supp. at 711, 713-14 (foregoing mention in the school yearbook and
newspaper).

185. See supra notes 104-57 and accompanying text.
186. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971). See supra notes 28-103 and
accompanying text.
187. Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263 (1981).
188. Chess v. Widmar, 480 F. Supp. 907, 914 (W.D. Mo. 1979), rev'd, 635
F.2d 1310 (8th Cir. 1980), affd sub nom. Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263

(1981).
189. This conclusion results regardless of whether the policy is already
in existence or if a school board is granting religious clubs rights previously
denied when the board inserts the club into the already existing program.
See, e.g., Brandon, 635 F.2d at 973; Lubbock Civil Liberties Union, 669 F.2d
at 1039.
190. See supra notes 64-93 and accompanying text.
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incidental. 191 Two factors in the area of sponsorship, the spectrum of the groups and the maturity of the students, were
deemed especially relevant. 192 At the high school scene each of
these factors are equally relevant. The more groups in existence, the stronger the case is for the Bible clubs to be recognized. The ultimate question of how many groups will suffice to
be a relevant factor is one to which the Court gave no guidance.
The lower courts will be left to decide this issue on their own.
The existence of one hundred groups at the University of Mis193
souri at Kansas City, however, was determined sufficient.
94
The Bender court held that twenty-five would suffice.
The maturity of the students circumvents the problem of
state association, or the imprimatur of approval. The Widmar
Court noted that college students were less impressionable than
younger students and would be able to distinguish sponsorship
from accomodation.195 The question which must be answered,
of course, is "at what age is one able to make such an appreciation and distinction?"' 96 The Supreme Court has not provided
guidance on this issue. Certainly an elementary school student
would not be able to perceive a distinction between accomodation and endorsement. But it is difficult to argue that students
in whom the states recognize the capacity to make incredibly
difficult decisions cannot make the distinction of state sponsorship. As one judge has pointed out; "[T]he court can take judicial notice of the progressively higher levels of intellectual and
emotional development of students in the latter grades of secondary schools ....
High school students ... are at an age approaching both adulthood 197 and franchise.' 9 8
191. 454 U.S. at 274.
192. Id., n. 14.
193. Id. at 274.
194. 563 F. Supp. at 711. The court noted that'size of the group in the high
school did not prevent it from being classified as a "broad" class. Indeed,
the court recognized that a high school, because of its smaller population,
would naturally have fewer organizations than normally found on univer-

sity campuses. The court noted that the groups at Williamsport included a
wide range of interests, including sports, government, social service, dramatics, journalism, language and music. Id.

195. 454 U.S. at 274 n. 14.
196. See Ladd, supra note 175.
197. While students in high school are legally minors, they are more and
more gaining legal rights as adults. Many states have recognized that the
youth of our nation should be accorded greater benefits and responsibility.
The decision of many legislators to reduce the age of majority to eighteen
reflects this new attitude. See, e.g., HAwAn REV. STAT. § 577-1 (Supp. 1975)
("All persons, whether male or female, residing in the State, who have attained the age of eighteen, shall be regarded as of legal age and their period
of minority to have ceased".); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 1, § 173 (1972) ("Persons of
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Widmar disposed of the argument that religion would be advanced by the financial aid in the form of rent-free classrooms
and free utilities. "[I] f the Establishment Clause barred the extension of general benefits to religious groups, 'a church could
not be protected by the police and fire departments, or have its
public sidewalk kept in repair.'"199 As for the excessive entanglement prong of the test, Widmar approved the court of appeals' statement that the universities would risk greater
entanglement attempting to enforce exclusions of worship and
prayer. 200 The circuit court commented that the administrative
entanglement of supervision at the high school level would create more problems. 20 1 Judge Nealon, in Bender v. Williamsport
Area School District, held that supervision or monitoring is not
necessarily excessively entangling.20 2 He examined the court
approved services which the state provided for the celebration
of a papal Mass at the National Mall in 1977.203 In so doing the
state involved itself in ensuring orderliness. He analogized the
the age of eighteen years shall be considered of age and until they attain
that age, shall be minors.").
However, even youths under the age of eighteen are being accorded
more rights. Minors who have sufficient capacity to understand the nature
and consequences of proposed medical treatment may consent to that treatment on the same terms as an adult. See Wadlington, Minors and Health
Care: The Age of Consent, 11 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 115 (1973). This right has
been granted to minors statutorily in several states. See, e.g., Miss. CODE
ANN. § 7129-81(h) (Supp. 1971) ("Any unemancipated minors of sufficient
intelligence to understand and appreciate the consequences of the proposed surgical or medical treatment or procedures ... may effectively consent to such treatment."). See generally STANDARDS RELATING TO RIGiiTS OF
MINORS, JUVENILE JUSTICE STANDARDS (1980).

198. Seyfried v. Walton, 668 F.2d 214, 219-20 (3d Cir. 1981) (Rosenn, J.,
concurring), cited with approval in Bender v. Williamsport Area School
Dist. 563 F. Supp. 697, 712 (M.D. Pa. 1983).
199. Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. at 274-75 (citing Roemer, 426 U.S. at 767).
200. Chess v. Widmar, 635 F.2d 1310, 1319 (8th Cir. 1980), affid sub nom.
Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263 (1981). The Supreme Court explained:
We agree with the Court of Appeals that the University would risk
greater "entanglement" by attempting to enforce its exclusion of "rehgious worship" and "religious speech." Initially, the University would
need to determine which words and activities fall within "religious worship and religious teaching." This alone could prove "an impossible
task in an age where many and various beliefs meet the constitutional
definition of religion." There would also be a continuing need to monitor group meetings to ensure compliance with the rule.
454 U.S. at 272 n. 11 (citation omitted).
201. Chess v. Widmar, 635 F.2d at 1319. "[H]igh school students necessarily require more supervision than do young adults of college age."
202. Bender, 563 F. Supp. at 715.
203. Judge Nealon was referring to O'Hair v. Andrus, 613 F.2d 931
(D.C.Cir. 1979). There, the court denied petitioner an injunction enjoining
the Mass pending appeal. The court noted the Interior Department would
expend between $128,450 and $178,450 in connection with the Mass. Id. at
933. Finding this amount not to exceed that which would be expended for

19841

Bible Study Clubs

ordering of a school meeting to this situation and determined
that the classroom supervision would involve no more entanglement than that provided at the Mass.2 ° 4 Remembering that involvement or supervision is permissible and excessive
involvement or excessive supervision is impermissible, the excessive entanglement test is passed. Moreover, as in Widmar, to
205
hold otherwise would risk greater entanglement.
A careful analysis of the Bible club problem in light of
Widmar allows for a similar outcome. Where a public high
school creates the possibility for students to participate in noninstructional activities or groups, a voluntary club whose purpose is religious has a constitutional right to exist.
CONCLUSION

Unless the Supreme Court takes a case on similar issues,
this area of Bible study clubs in the public high schools will remain in confusion. Until then, the type of Bible study club allowed in Bender is prohibited in the second and fifth judicial
circuits, California, the Southern District of West Virginia and
the Western District of Oklahoma. 20 6 Legislation is now pending in the Senate in the form of a bill specifically extending the
Widmar principle to federally funded high schools. Senate Bill
2928 provides:
That no public secondary school receiving Federal financial assistance, which generally allows groups of students to meet during
non-instructional periods, shall discriminate against any meeting of
students on the basis of the religious content of the speech at the
meeting, if (1) the meeting is voluntary and orderly, 20
and
7 (2) no activity which is in and of itself unlawful is permitted.
The bill has been adjudged constitutional by at least one scholar
other outdoor gatherings at the Mall, the court held for a neutrality of equal
access. Id. at 935.
204. Judge Nealon analogized:
The teacher chosen to "monitor" the meetings would be the functional
equivalent of a policeman at a religious rally held in a public park. Just
as the policeman in the above situation is acting to fulfill an obligation
to society by ensuring peaceful discussion, so too would a teacher acting as a monitor during Petros' meetings be fulfilling an obligation to
the school by maintaining order among the students. While the
teacher's presence certainly would involve some "entanglement" with
the meetings, such "limited and incidental entanglement between
church and state authority is inevitable in a complex modern society."
In short, the "entanglement" would not be "excessive."
Bender, 563 F. Supp. at 715 (citations omitted).
205. See supra note 200.
206. See supra notes 104-57 and accompanying text.
207. S. 815 § 3, 98th Cong., 1st Sess., 129 CONG. REC. 2933 (1983) (proposed
by Sen. Hatfield). See also 128 CONG. REC. S 11780-86 (daily ed. Sept. 17,

1982) (remarks concerning S. 2728, similar legislation).
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of American constitutional law, Laurence Tribe. 20 8 Again, however, the courts must test its validity. The likelihood that school
districts would rather drop their religious activity accomodations rather than become involved in expensive litigation is
great. This has recently been the case in Sonoma, California,
Anderson County, South Carolina and Saddleback,
209
California.
Bender provides the only affirmative guidance to school districts. 210 When the Fifth Circuit struck down Lubbock's policy,

four justices dissented to the denial of the school district's petition for rehearing. 2 11 In dissent, the justices called for a responsible judiciary to give more guidance to school districts. Justice
Reavley warned: "We should not forget.. . that the young student may also be given the impression that our government and
208. Telephone interview with Sen. Hatfield (Oct. 17, 1983).
209. These examples came from Senator Hatfield's amici curiae brief to
the Supreme Court. Lubbock Civil Liberties Union v. Lubbock Indep.
School Dist., 669 F.2d 1038 (5th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 103 S.Ct. 800 (1983),
reprinted in 128 CONG. REC. S 16007, 16008 (daily ed. Dec. 21, 1982). The
Amici related the situations:
In Sonoma, California, a group of high school students who had been
meeting to discuss religious topics was recently disbanded by the
school's principal after nearly ten years as a recognized student group.
The school district's legal counsel, after reviewing this Court's decision
in Widmar and the Fifth Circuit's decision in the instant case, advised
the principal that Lubbock controlled in the high school setting and this
prohibited the group's activities.
In Anderson County, South Carolina, students have been meeting
weekly in school facilities for the past two years before school buses
arrived for prayer, Bible study and religious discussions. The students
have met on school premises pursuant to a written policy applying to
non-student groups allowing use of the school facilities "to promote the
general cultural, civic, religious, educational and social welfare of the
community." The policy was clarified in November 1982 to make explicit that religious activity is not permitted during the school day. The
group may continue to meet under this policy. The local affiliate of the
American Civil Liberties Union has threatened to sue the school board
if the religious activities continue.
In Saddleback, California, a written school policy permitted student groups to meet to discuss issues without regard to content and
subject matter. The policy distinguished between sponsored clubs,
which received financial support and supervision from the school, and
student-initiated groups, which received no such support. A studentinitiated group met during the school lunch period to discuss topical
issues and read passages from the Bible. The American Civil Liberties
Union filed suit against the school board, asking that the policy, as applied, be declared unconstitutional. The suit was dropped when a
newly elected school board promulgated a new policy that allows only
sponsored clubs.
128 CONG. REC. at S 16008-09. See also 128 CONG. REC. at S 11782 (daily ed.
Sept. 17, 1982) (other examples of school board actions taken in response to
requests for accommodation by students).
210. 563 F. Supp. 697 (M.D. Pa. 1983).
211. 680 F.2d 424 (5th Cir. 1982).
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the courts and the schools are hostile to all religious belief and
practice. I would consider that a very great wrong to the children, to the Constitution and to the nation. '2 12 Absent a definitive answer from the Supreme Court, Justice Reavley's
conclusion is not an unlikely possibility.
Mark J. Lura

212. Id. at 426.

